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comparing the way in which these techniques approach the fun-
damental concept of representation is the first part of a more long-
term project1.
Generally speaking, “representation” is defined in philosophy 
as what one represents to oneself, the concrete content of an act 
of thinking2. More specifically, it is the production of a previous 
perception. In this paper, “representation” will be taken to mean the 
psychical construction – conscious and unconscious – that enables 
an individual to have a representation of the self and to make his or 
her experience meaningful. That construction depends on traces of 
previous experiences and on the presenting elements of the situa-
tion which at that moment is being experienced.
We have no intention of attempting to evoke similarities that go 
beyond what is actually the case, in a kind of syncretic approach 
the aim of which would be to argue that everything is just the 
same. On the contrary, we shall try to put forward a real attempt 
at comparison, with the idea of going beyond the – obviously 
important – differences in vocabulary; these are due to the fact that 
IntroductIon
The aim of this theoretical paper is to compare the cognitive- 
behavioral and psychoanalytical approaches with respect to the way 
in which each of them conceives of representation and deal with the 
issues that this involves. Although their theoretical background is 
very different, both approaches concern the same psychopathologi-
cal domain. In addition, as we shall see, in both of them conscious 
and latent (unconscious) representations play a crucial role. It is 
for this reason that, in our view, it is interesting to explore how, 
both theoretically and clinically, these two methods conceive of 
and deal with representation. Highlighting these similarities and 
differences may not only facilitate communication on a theoretical 
level but also prove helpful to the clinical practitioners involved: 
We would argue that the more detailed are the theoretical concepts 
that clinicians have at their disposal, the greater will be their ability 
to pay close attention to what is specific to psychopathology – i.e., 
the distress of those with whom they are dealing – to understand 
it, and to treat it successfully. Also, the decision as to which spe-
cific form of psychotherapy to undertake would then be based on 
a more fundamental understanding of the different techniques. 
As we all know, scientific discussion between clinicians who carry 
out cognitive-behavioral therapies (CBT) and those who practise 
psychoanalytical psychotherapy is very limited. This attempt at 
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1The second part of this project will focus on comparing the concepts of “emotional 
regulation” (CBT) and “internal excitation” (psychoanalysis).
2Cf. the Oxford English Dictionary: “the action of presenting to the mind or imagi-
nation; an image thus presented.”
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the conditions under which theories are constructed in these two 
approaches are themselves significantly different. In constructing 
its theoretical corpus, the psychoanalytical approach focuses almost 
exclusively on the observation and understanding of clinical situa-
tions. For this reason, many of the assumptions of psychoanalysis 
have not been tested empirically, whereas a significant part of the 
concepts developed in the cognitive-behavioral approach comes 
from experiments on human beings or on animals. The resultant 
major differences in vocabulary are unavoidable.
In this attempt at comparison, we have had to isolate some 
aspects of these respective theorizations. We realize that, in so doing, 
the overall scientific constructions to which these belong will not 
be dealt with in their globality.
There are no doubt many overlapping elements in the way 
in which the workings of the mind are conceived of in these 
approaches, particularly as regards the pathological role played by 
elements that are avoided, suppressed from memory or repressed, 
and with respect to the need to treat such material in a specific 
manner so as to ensure some progress as to the symptoms presented.
There are also significant differences, particularly as regards 
two dimensions. The first concerns the clinical approach to trau-
matic representations with a view to diminishing their pathological 
impact. The second relates to the fact that psychoanalysis seems to 
focus more than does the cognitive approach on the actual content 
of representations.
We shall now examine the specific way in which each of these 
psychological techniques takes representation into account. In 
order to do so, we shall explain how “representation” is defined 
in psychoanalysis and in CBT, then show how representations are 
dealt with in each of these clinical approaches.
How do tHese procedures defIne “representatIon?”
“representatIon” In psycHoanalysIs
At the very beginning of his work, in his “Project for a Scientific 
Psychology,” Freud (1950 [1887–1902]) defined representation as 
a construction of thinking that may be completely independent of 
perception. Perception implies the presence of an external object 
or stimulus, whereas representation may involve simply an image 
in memory. Some representations are conscious; the individual has 
easy access to them, and they are usually based on perceptions of 
reality. These representations can be expressed verbally, thus indi-
cating a translation/transposition of images and ideas into words 
(thing-presentations becoming word-presentations) and we see 
here the importance of the representation format in psychoanalysis 
process. Given that our representations may not correspond exactly 
to reality, our actual experiences can help us “correct” these (for 
example: “I thought that I was no good at mathematics, but when 
I began to get good marks in that subject, with a different teacher, 
that “corrected” my previous – mistaken – representation of what 
I was capable of.”).
“Mistaken” representations (“psychical reality”) can have psy-
chopathological repercussions: the spider which, for the phobic 
person, is much more than a simple arachnid, the lift/elevator 
that becomes equated with a stifling cage, the inflexible image of 
the “professor” which always gives the student sitting an exami-
nation a representation of being a failure. Making some impact 
on such representations is a crucial element in almost all current 
 psychotherapies, because, as we know, in spite of all the  explanations 
and experiences that might have “corrected” them, they may well 
still be operative. “Internal reality” – i.e., representations, patterns, 
pre-conceived ideas – seems in some cases to be more “real” than 
external reality. Internal reality then prevails over reality as such, 
and in return influences our perception of that reality.
We thus have within ourselves both representations that are 
accessible and those of which we are not conscious, which are 
implicit, but which nonetheless may cause considerable distress 
(for example: “I am very anxious whenever I have to sit an exam, 
but I don’t know why, given that I’m a very good student.” The 
representation of a teacher who cannot but be “wicked” is uncon-
scious). In such a case, it is important that the therapeutic approach 
adopted reveals the existence of this kind of unconscious or implicit 
representation. For the psychoanalytical approach, it then becomes 
necessary to see how an unconscious representation can be made 
conscious. In order to understand that process it is necessary to 
explore both the relationship between representation and affect 
and the deferred retroactive effect (après-coup/“afterwardsness”).
What, then, is the relationship between representation and 
affect/emotion? Freud made a distinction between representa-
tion and affect. Affect is defined as belonging to the dimension of 
something that is “felt,” not as something that can be represented; 
it links up with a representation but cannot as such be processed. 
Affect has links with representations and can move from one to 
another. It is this displacement of affect that makes its origins so 
difficult for the person concerned to interpret. The reason behind 
these displacements is the existence of psychical conflicts and the 
individual’s inability to represent the situation to him- or herself, 
given that the affects relating to it require too much of an effort for 
the mental apparatus. The original representation is thus repressed/
suppressed/split-off because it is too painful and intolerable for 
the ego.
The relative immaturity of the infant’s mental apparatus explains 
why, in the psychoanalytical approach, repression takes place 
mainly in childhood. Repression, however, applies to representa-
tion; it does not make the corresponding affect disappear once and 
for all. Suppression of that associated affect is therefore not com-
pletely effective. It can easily be reactivated, either spontaneously 
or via the encounter with an event that leads to the “return of the 
repressed” – i.e., a situation that revives the initial memory image or 
reveals to the individual a meaning of that original representation 
of which he or she was until then unaware (the deferred retroactive 
effect)3. The work of analysis consists not only in connecting the 
relevant affect to its original representations, but also in making it 
possible to put words on the link between affects and representa-
tions: a man who consults a psychoanalyst because he feels very 
shy in the presence of women discovers that the shame he feels 
with respect to his own body and the negative representations of 
3As a result of Nachträglichkeit (deferred action/après-coup), as defined by Freud 
(1950 [1887–1902], 1918 [1914]), a given event may not be experienced as trauma-
tic when it actually occurs; it may become so as result of another event that brings 
new meaning to it. According to Laplanche (2002, p. 121), the concept of après-
coup [“afterwardsness”] sets up a complex and reciprocal relationship between a 
significant event and its later re-signifying, attributing to it a new kind of psychical 
effectiveness. There are, then, two phases in the constitution of mental trauma: the 
event itself, and the moment when it becomes meaningful for the mind.
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representations were at that point thought of as being the memory 
trace of emotional conditioning: links between perceptual elements 
(stimuli) and emotional responses. Applied to the above example, 
snake phobia would be characterized by a rigid fear representation, 
i.e., an associative network comprising stimulus elements (e.g., the 
shape of the snake, their typical undulatory movements), response 
elements (e.g., accelerated heart rate, screaming, running away), 
and meaning elements (e.g., “danger!”).
Theorizations as regards representation in CBT have changed 
somewhat since then (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004). Current theories share 
a set of premises that we shall discuss briefly. These theories are 
called “multi-level” because they start from the premise according 
to which emotional information is represented at various cognitive 
levels. A distinction is made between at least two kinds of represen-
tation involved in the production and regulation of emotions: one 
is implicit and automatic, while the other is explicit and controlled. 
Philippot et al. (2007) have proposed a synthesis of multi-level 
approaches through their dual-memory model which differenti-
ates between a schematic/associative system and a propositional/
conceptual one; this distinction is common to all multi-level mod-
els. The schematic/associative system corresponds to the implicit 
memory of emotional meanings that the individual attaches to 
a given situation. The propositional/conceptual system has to do 
with the declarative and conceptual knowledge that the person 
has of emotions.
The schematic/associative system (Barnard and Teasdale, 1991; 
Smith and Kirby, 2000) is made up of schemata. Schemata are 
abstract implicit representations which integrate sensory, per-
ceptual, and semantic information from a certain category of 
emotional experiences with the bodily responses that are usually 
associated with these. For most people working in this domain, 
schemata are associative representations, i.e., sets of the individual’s 
classic emotional conditionings. In other words, a schema is a gen-
eral representation made up of associations between (a) perceptual 
indicators of the emotional situations that the individual experi-
ences, (b) his or her bodily responses to these, and (c) the concepts 
and mental images that, as a rule, are activated simultaneously with 
the other components of the schema. For example, the perceptual 
features of the mother’s breast, such as those resulting from touch 
or smell, automatically generate an approach response in the new-
born. Through repetition, associations between these innate traits 
that generate the approach response and other sensations, such as 
hearing the mother’s voice or smelling her perfume, are integrated 
into the schema.
Schemata, then, are constructed automatically by abstract-
ing features common to various similar emotional experiences; 
they are constituted via the associations most frequently made 
in any given emotional situation. Direct experience is the only 
way in which information can feed into a schema. Insofar as it 
is a representation, a schema is not accessible to consciousness. 
Nevertheless, it can be inferred from the changes that it brings 
about, particularly as regards sensations and bodily modifications. 
For example, someone who suffers from panic attacks could infer 
his or her panic schema by observing, via those panic experiences, 
what permanent features exist between his or her perceptions, 
thoughts, and mental images on the one hand and bodily panic 
reactions on the other.
masculinity that he has inside himself are related to the denigrating 
way in which, in his view, his mother saw him. Linking a current 
affect to representations that belong to an earlier context in his 
family enables such a patient gradually to distance himself from 
“his mother’s grasp;” but distancing himself may generate anxiety 
because it implies also distancing himself from the representation 
of his mother that he has inside himself (his “internal object”).
However, as Freud (1937) pointed out at the end of his life, we 
cannot be sure to find the “true” original affect, reason why the 
change of representation format gets most important (Roussillon, 
1999, 2008; Golse and Roussillon, 2010). With the help of “construc-
tions” of what is not memorable, new meanings of connections 
between affects and representation can be created, leading on the 
same time to greater flexibility.
Interestingly enough, Freud singled out two kinds of represen-
tation depending on whether they are conscious or not: “thing”-
presentations and “word”-presentations. Thing-presentations are 
simply images that cannot be put into words; they are infra-verbal. 
Word-presentations, on the other hand, can be expressed verbally. 
The phobic is “scared stiff” of spiders, but that fear cannot easily 
be expressed verbally; it would seem that the representative image 
(the spider) takes precedence over the capacity to put that fear into 
words. The “thing” in this case is the spider, the terrifying nature 
of which cannot be verbally explained in an intelligent way by the 
person who has that fear. If a thing-presentation is active uncon-
sciously, mainly as an image, it has to be put into words in order for 
it to be accessible to treatment – it has to be expressed and thereby, 
at least to some extent, transformed into a word-presentation.
From the psychoanalytical point of view, two specific modes 
of thought are typical of these kinds of representation: “primary” 
(thought) processes, set up via an often “mistaken” association 
between images, and “secondary” (thought) processes, character-
ized by reasoned associations that can be expressed in words and 
shared through relationships with other people.
representatIon In cognItIve-beHavIoral tHerapIes of 
emotIons
Initially, behavior therapies were based exclusively on behaviorist 
learning theory, which rejected any implication of the idea of rep-
resentation, arguing that, as a concept, it could not be observed and 
therefore could not be dealt with scientifically. However, in practice, 
one of the earliest kinds of behavior therapy developed by Wolpe 
(1961), systematic desensitization, was based on mental images. 
The person involved would gradually be exposed – in imagina-
tion – to the object of his or her fear. For instance, a snake phobic 
would be guided to mentally imagine encounters with snakes, with 
increasing levels of fear inducing features in the imagery script 
(for instance, moving from a placid snake to a very active one). 
Obviously, that approach was based on the activation of representa-
tions that had an intense emotional impact. Behavior therapy thus 
integrated fairly quickly what cognitive psychology was contribut-
ing, especially with respect to memory and representations. Lang 
(1979) was the first to set out a theory of representation that took 
into account what was being done in behavior therapy. From that 
point of view, the avowed aim of CBT became the modification of 
deep-lying emotional representations that led to emotional and 
behavioral reactions, which caused distress and suffering. Those 
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associated with the initial context. Even in this case, however, the 
affect remains linked to the initial representation that brought it 
about. For instance, for someone having once experienced excru-
ciating panic in a gun fight, later exposure to loud noises, in totally 
different contexts (e.g., a firework), will trigger the panic again.
Another difference lies in the way in which these theories con-
ceive of the relationship between image, verbalization, and con-
scious and unconscious processes. In psychoanalysis, “transiting via 
an image” plays a major role in becoming conscious of one’s uncon-
scious representations. The work of analysis makes it easier for 
these to be expressed as images of one kind or another, through the 
importance it attaches to dreams and to free association. Becoming 
conscious of something follows on from a process whereby words 
are put on such images: A thing-presentation is transformed into 
a word-presentation, and this process also enables the affect to be 
bound. Images therefore play a very important role in the proc-
ess that enables an element to become conscious. For cognitive 
theories, image-based non-verbal representations can be conscious 
– moreover, since image-based representations often have a strong 
emotional intensity (Holmes and Mathews, 2005), they tend to be 
immediately noticed by the person concerned; some writers argue 
that words weaken this as they become conscious and cut off part of 
the representation (cf. the theory of mindfulness, Philippot, 2007a, 
and that of embodied cognition, Barsalou, 1999).
A third difference lies in the fact that psychoanalysis, to a greater 
extent than cognitive approaches, focuses on the content of repre-
sentations and especially on the fact that some of these are shared 
by a significant number of people; there is, therefore, a kind of 
“community of content” which entails a specific kind of theoretical 
work in psychoanalysis and directs the analyst’s attention to certain 
aspects of what the patient is saying. These contents are universal in 
nature and they structure, in each and every one of us, the workings 
of our mind and our fundamental representations. The great myths 
shared by all humankind could be seen as a product of this. The 
best-known example is the Oedipus complex: the bodily experi-
ences and representations linked to this (“infantile sexuality”) set 
up, in the child, the processing of the difference between the sexes 
and between generations. In the cognitive-behavioral approach, 
there have been over time some developments in the manner in 
which the question of content has been treated. Initially, the focus 
was both on the thought processes involved – in particular the 
cognitive distortions that result in a biased perception of real-
ity – and on certain kinds of content or thematics – in particular 
“individual irrational beliefs” (Ellis, 1977) or “schemata” (Beck 
et al., 1979). These concepts refer to representations that remain 
inaccessible to consciousness, relating to the self, to others and to 
the world in general. For instance, a belief or schema could be that 
“one must act perfectly in order to be accepted, else he/she will be 
rejected”. Such schema would lead the person to focus on indices 
of imperfection in his/her action, neglecting other aspects, and 
consequently generating a distorted view of him/herself. Unlike 
the psychoanalytical approach, contents of representations are not 
here thought of as being universal in nature (“Oedipus complex”); 
they apply only to the individual(s) concerned. As a result, these 
representations have not been theorized on any general level with 
respect to their content. However, from a functional point of view, 
these representations, via the “cognitive distortions” that they entail, 
The propositional/conceptual system is a kind of explanatory 
theory concerning emotions. It is made up of distinct concepts 
which represent the various elements of any given emotional situ-
ation. Its knowledge base is a set of specific meanings: discrete 
concepts or mental images are joined together by specific semantic 
or episodic relationships – for example, the idea that muscular 
tension is an attribute of anger. The propositional knowledge base 
can be activated intentionally and consciously, either verbally or in 
pictorial mode. It enables emotions to be identified and communi-
cated verbally, and facilitates problem-solving in emotional situa-
tions. Any information that can be carried over into a network of 
propositional concepts can be incorporated into the propositional 
system. In this way, the units of the system can be built up on the 
basis of conversations, readings, and experiences.
These two kinds of representation, schematic and propositional, 
are in some ways linked together. As we have pointed out, concepts 
or mental images (propositional level) can be integrated within 
schemata (schematic/associative level). Take, for example, the case 
of someone who suffers from panic disorder as an illustration of 
what we are saying. In such a person, a series of perceptual indi-
cators (bodily sensations) activates a schematic representation 
of panic which includes representations and activation of bodily 
responses (hyperventilating, tachycardia, etc). When such a person 
is panicking, he or she tries to understand what is going on – and the 
most frequent interpretation is that of having a heart attack. Thus, 
when the individual’s panic schema is activated, he or she activates 
also concepts and mental images that have to do with cardiac arrest. 
If this is repeated, the concepts and mental images prototypically 
activated when the person feels panicky become associated with the 
panic schema. The activation of panic thus makes more accessible 
the ideas and images associated with a heart attack, and vice versa: 
every image or concept linked to that theme automatically activates 
the schema and its response – panic. A Valentine card, for example, 
representing a big heart may automatically trigger a panic attack 
in someone who suffers from that disorder.
a comparIson between tHese two conceptualIzatIons of 
representatIon
The psychoanalytical conception and that prevalent in the 
 cognitive-behavioral domain do therefore converge to some extent. 
Representations may be either conscious or unconscious; some 
can be activated automatically while others are activated volun-
tarily. They depend on past experiences. Nevertheless, there are 
some major differences, the main one no doubt being the fact that, 
in psychoanalysis, an affect does not necessarily originate in the 
representation or the circumstances that the person concerned 
evokes. It can move from one representation to another, which 
is why the emotion, affect, and symptom presented by that per-
son will be explored as to their true origins in the course of the 
treatment process.
The point of view adopted by cognitive theories is quite different: 
A given emotion is an integral part of the representation and the 
associative links are both many in number and difficult to modify. 
The affect/emotion is inextricably linked to its context, i.e., the 
antecedents that activate it and the responses and consequences 
that it entails. Generalizations of that emotional response may, of 
course, be observed; the affect is thus evoked also by other elements 
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and aversive, he or she will attempt to suppress or avoid it. 
However, since every emotion is an internal experience, it can-
not be avoided. Attempts to suppress or avoid it encourage the 
activation of automatic (schematic) processes which maintain 
and exacerbate the person’s emotional state. For the past 15 or so 
years (Hayes, 1994), CBT has come to understand the importance 
of subtle avoidance techniques with respect to emotions – they 
may turn out to be a crucial factor in psychopathology. This 
kind of avoidance does not consist in avoiding or suppressing 
all information concerning the emotional problem that is being 
encountered; it aims at avoiding specifically anything that could 
possibly evoke an emotional response. The person concerned will 
think about the problem to the point of brooding over it – but in 
an over-generalizing and abstract manner rather than in a specific 
and concrete way, making use of verbal rather than image-based 
processes from the point of view of a spectator rather than as 
an agent, focusing on the past and the future rather than on the 
present moment.
From that point of view, the work of psychotherapy consists in 
becoming conscious of the emotional experience and exploring it 
in an experiential way in the given problem situation (Philippot, 
2007b). The person is encouraged not only to face up to situations 
that he or she fears and therefore avoids but also – and above all – to 
feel and explore the emotions that these situations evoke. During 
these emotional exposures, the individual is encouraged to adopt 
an experiential approach (based on what he or she actually feels) 
rather than an analytical one (based on the analysis of the reasons 
for and consequences of his or her state). This approach is facili-
tated by its focus on the present experience, in which the agency 
element is predominant, concentrating on the concrete and specific 
features of that experience in order to encourage the free activation 
of schematic/associative and propositional/conceptual systems. By 
encouraging the person to focus on his or her direct experience of a 
given situation, CBT differs significantly from the psychoanalytical 
approach, with its emphasis on verbalization and interpretation.
tHe stabIlIty of representatIons and tHeIr lInks 
wItH affects: a sHared assocIatIve poInt of vIew
The starting point of Freud’s hypothesis is that links between 
representations and/or between affects, given their accompany-
ing intensity of excitation, are woven together into a network of 
neural connections. It assumes that “indelible” traces emerge, linked 
to psychical events – and in particular traumatic ones – as a result 
of “facilitation” (Freud, 1950 [1887–1902]). That so-created “path-
way” will be taken even though the particular connection between 
affect and representation may change during one’s lifespan. The 
original connection usually remains “forever” unknown. Edelman 
(1992) has suggested that souvenirs do not correspond to concrete 
fixed traces but to the souvenir of neuronal pathways linked to the 
experience of a given event.
In learning theory (e.g., Rescorla, 1988), the link between rep-
resentation and affect is set up via contiguity and the repeated 
association between a given event and a feeling. Currently, learning 
theory also maintains that once such a link is set up, it is not easy 
to undo it (Bouton, 2004).
There is therefore some degree of convergence between these two 
approaches as regards the link between representations and affects.
would appear to determine how reality is interpreted and, therefore, 
our behavioral and emotional reactions to it. Subsequently – and 
this is the current position – CBT came to focus on thought proc-
esses as such (Harvey et al., 2004). The difficulties that a person 
finds him- or herself facing – and, more specifically, the fact that 
they persist without any natural solution being found to resolve 
them – are not so much due to the content of what the individual 
is worried about as a result of the way in which he or she treats the 
information relating to this concern. For example, in this way of 
looking at the situation, depression is triggered and subsequently 
maintained not so much by the content of the depressed person’s 
thoughts (“I am worthless and everything is hopeless”) as by the 
manner of his or her thinking: abstract and verbal rather than 
concrete and image-based, focusing on the analysis of the causes 
and consequences of his or her situation rather than on how it is 
experienced (Watkins, 2008).
tHe tHerapeutIc approacH
From the psychoanalytical point of view, thought processes 
that apply to thing-presentations [“primary (thought) proc-
esses”] emerge for example in dream-images and also – at least 
to some extent – through free association (Bollas, 2006). Word-
presentations [“secondary (thought) processes”] enable situations 
to be expressed in words and belong to the field of consciousness. 
Analytical work on representations has as its principal aim the 
transformation of image-based representations, linked to highly 
intense affects, into word-presentations (Golse and Roussillon, 
2010), thereby enabling the associated excitations (affects, emo-
tions) to be bound. These image-based representations are revealed 
involuntarily by the analysand through his or her free associations 
or dream-content (Freud, 1900; Bollas, 2006). With the help of the 
analyst – the analyst’s accompanying presence (supporting the ana-
lysand’s ego) and interpretations (which clarify the unconscious 
and pre-conscious links behind the analysand’s associations) – the 
analysand will be able to put into words representations that until 
then could not be formulated properly (Widlöcher and Fedida, 
1995). This entails transforming image-based representations 
(“thing-presentations”) into word-presentations and binding 
together affects and representations. In psychoanalytical theory, 
this is called “working-through” or “processing”. In addition to 
working on the analysand’s free associations, an important part 
of working-through is done via the analysis of representations, 
actualized in the transference relationship, of earlier relationship 
patterns (Levine, 2010); these can be analyzed thanks to the neu-
trality of the analyst who, in addition, agrees to be the target of 
these (transference-based) re-actualizations.
For a psychoanalyst, failures in the processing of representa-
tions play an important part in the emergence of various kinds of 
symptoms, hence Freud’s famous comment (in the “Preliminary 
Communication;” Breuer and Freud, 1893): “Hysterics suffer 
mainly from reminiscences” (1893, p. 7). An important part of the 
analyst’s work lies in trying to help the patient rediscover the links 
between representations and affects (Golse and Roussillon, 2010).
From the point of view of CBT, one of the main origins of 
psychological suffering lies in the avoidance of emotional expe-
riences (Barlow et al., 2004). Since the person involved is afraid 
that a given emotional experience may prove too threatening 
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is activated during tasks in which the individual has to search his 
or her memory actively for certain elements; environmental stimuli 
do not activate it to the same extent.
The cognitive approach describes several kinds of processing 
emotional information when working-through proves impossible 
(when the information cannot be assimilated within the associa-
tive network). Two of the main mechanisms are “suppression” and 
“avoidance.” The terms employed here are therefore different from 
those used in psychoanalysis: “repression” and “splitting,” for exam-
ple. Just as in psychoanalytical theory – failures in working-through 
give rise to the “return of the repressed” expressed as symptoms 
– in the cognitive approach, failure to process primary emotions 
is pathogenic. According to Barlow and Allen (2007), avoidance is 
the main force behind any aggravation of emotional distress. They 
argue that primary emotions (those directly evoked by a given situa-
tion) are not the root cause of patients’ psychological suffering; this 
is due to the refusal to take the primary emotion on board, thereby 
generating a series of secondary emotions that are pathogenic. In 
addition, both avoidance and suppression of primary emotions 
come at a price – cognitive, affect-based, and behavioral. They bring 
about disorders of attention, of memory or of executive functions, 
often create an overall sense of dysphoria, and, in behavioral terms, 
tend to limit the individual’s sphere of activity. Hence the impor-
tance of the work of processing primary emotions.
In this approach, there are two highly subtle mechanisms for 
avoiding emotions: the development of abstract generalized think-
ing, with little in the way of images concerning the event that is 
being avoided, and mental ruminating. Both of these give the illu-
sion of an attempt at processing the relevant thoughts. In therapy, 
the cognitive-behavioral approach attempts to process primary 
emotional information and more particularly, in order to limit 
recourse to over-generalization, to make specific the emotional 
perceptions and representations involved.
some poInts of convergence between tHe two 
approacHes: sHarIng certaIn aspects of tHeIr 
tHeoretIcal and tHerapeutIc corpus
In both approaches, representations play a major role in defining 
an experience and preforming perceptions. In both also, the fail-
ure to process adequately a memory that cannot be represented is 
pathogenic. In a more or less explicit manner, they maintain that the 
relationship between representations or between representations 
and affects is set up through a process of associations. In addition, 
they are in agreement when it comes to the part played by conscious 
and unconscious processes.
They agree also that difficulties which arise in the processing of 
some representations have to do with the fact that these cannot be 
assimilated or embodied within the set of representations that the 
individual has of the self or of the world. For both approaches, an 
affect/emotion is a kind of signal announcing that an event is about 
to pose a threat to the system of representations. The mechanisms 
that prevent information processing go under different names: in 
psychoanalysis, “repression,” and in cognitive-behavioral theory, 
“avoidance.” They agree also that failure to process information 
entails major repercussions of a psychopathological nature. For 
the psychoanalytical approach, the repressed conflict will “return,” 
perhaps manifesting itself as symptoms. For CBT, the avoided 
tHe part played by representatIons In 
psycHopatHologIcal states: How psycHoanalysIs 
and cognItIve-beHavIoral tHerapy envIsage tHIs
In the early stages of cognitive theory, particularly in Lang’s (1979) 
bio-informational theory, mental distress was thought of as being 
related to some pathological emotional representation or other. 
That representation included the elements that triggered the emo-
tion (stimuli) and the emotional responses to these. Therefore the 
representation contained in itself that emotional response, in a 
kind of “embodied” cognition (Barsalou, 1999). This would later 
become more complex, with the inclusion within the representa-
tion of the meaning that is attributed to the relevant emotion. 
The pathological nature of the association comes from the inflex-
ibility of the structure of relationships between the elements of 
the representation (a stimulus automatically leads to a particular 
response or activates a given meaning) and from its unrealistic 
and dysfunctional aspect.
As in the psychoanalytical approach, Tallis’s (1999) cognitive 
theory describes the remembering of traumatic events in terms of 
unintentional thoughts or images that have proved impossible to 
process, given the extent of the gap between these representations 
in memory and the individual’s own representations and models 
concerning how the world “ought to be” and relating to his- or 
herself-perception and place in the world. These “intrusions” are 
adaptive only insofar as they mobilize strategies that facilitate 
problem-solving.
Traumatic events cannot be assimilated if they are too far 
removed from pre-existing structures of representation. Since the 
structures that process emotional information are the organizers 
of the self, there will be repeated attempts at processing traumatic 
emotional information with the aim of assimilating these elements. 
Once they are assimilated, the information will be less easy to reac-
tivate, because it no longer represents a challenge to the self.
That description is similar to the picture that Freud himself 
painted in his portrayal of traumatic neuroses, highlighting the 
unsuccessful and repeated attempts at binding when the too-frag-
ile ego has been overwhelmed by a traumatic event. Freud (1926 
[1925]) emphasized the fact that psychical trauma have a damaging 
effect. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, he showed how the 
ego can also be overwhelmed by drive-related impulses that have 
the effect of a psychical trauma. When faced with these internal or 
external dangers, the ego tries to fight against them by means of 
its defense mechanisms or by attempting to find a “compromise” 
between desire and prohibition. Both of these mechanisms may 
give rise to symptom-formations.
Graf and Mandler (1984), in their “associative” cognitive con-
ception, make a distinction between integration and processing 
of mental representations that have an emotional content. They 
argue that integration is an automatic process which reinforces the 
internal structure of the representation. A well-integrated represen-
tation, the internal cohesion of which is solid, will easily be activated 
by an encounter, in the environment, with stimuli that contain some 
of its aspects. This is in fact a reference to what we described earlier 
in terms of the automatic activation of the schematic/associative 
system. Processing or working-through is more complex and non-
automatic; it enables the creation of associations between several 
representations in the cognitive network. That associative network 
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more on exploring emotions, thus doing the opposite of  avoidance 
and suppression and integrating emotional information into 
the individual’s self-knowledge. Another important element of 
this approach consists in dealing with schematic aspects and in 
becoming aware of the bodily reactions associated with these. In 
exposure therapy, for example, CBT practitioners agree that it is 
important that there be a real exposure to the emotions that arise 
in emotional situations while looking out for the sometimes very 
subtle mechanisms by which emotions are avoided. In particular, 
it is essential that the person in treatment does not simply evoke 
the situation in which a given emotion arises without actually 
activating that emotion itself.
In CBT, the tendency to over-generalize emotions is looked upon 
as a strategy for avoiding them. When people talk in very general 
or abstract terms, they are attempting to avoid painful emotions. 
Emotional information that is too general or too abstract is dif-
ficult to modify or to “invalidate.” Taking the person’s own back-
ground history into account – as is done in psychoanalysis – is one 
way of reviving situations that have already been experienced and 
the representations that are linked to them. That procedure gives 
rise to a more specific autobiographical memory which enables a 
much more focused kind of work to be done on past and present 
 emotions/affects; memory is less generalized, thus also allowing a 
better differentiation between past and present.
Another important difference between the two approaches 
lies in how they consider the thematic aspects of representations. 
In psychoanalysis, unconscious representations are structured 
in accordance with universal patterns, in particular the Oedipus 
complex. Only the resolution of these patterns is specific to each 
individual. Therefore, the themes found in unconscious repre-
sentations are identical for everybody, whatever the particular 
experiences that each individual has. On the other hand, in the 
cognitive-behavioral approach, the themes encountered in repre-
sentations are entirely idiosyncratic. They depend on each person’s 
own experiences, as well as on his or her innate features and tem-
perament. Obviously enough, in any given society, human beings 
will often share similar experiences, hence the fact that there may 
well be resemblances in some thematic aspects of their represen-
tations. These, however, are not universal; they always depend on 
the very concrete and personal experiences that each individual 
has gone through.
There is also a difference between the two approaches as to 
the way in which they envisage the activation of representations 
during the therapeutic process. In CBT, the clinical hypothesis 
is that the activation (optimal, not maximal) of information 
relating to an (underlying) schema leads to a re-experiencing 
of the emotions involved. The therapist has a collaborative 
relationship with the person being treated and suggests certain 
exploratory experiences that the latter can adjust to his or her 
capacities and motivation. In psychoanalysis, optimal activation 
is decided upon by the patient him- or herself. Enough space is 
given so that patients can take up different themes at their own 
rhythm (speaking freely, following particular lines of thought, 
free associations, the unfolding of the transference); this enables 
the patient to regulate how and when representations evocative 
of painful emotions are explored (this is one reason why psy-
choanalytical treatment takes so long).
emotional material or the mental effort deployed to maintain the 
avoidance of primary emotions will have similar consequences. 
As regards therapy, both approaches argue in favor of attempting 
to process the original information while acknowledging that that 
processing in itself may not be enough to free the individual from 
the traces left by the emotions, the learning situation or even the 
system of representations.
wHere tHe two approacHes dIverge
They differ firstly in their interpretation of the relationship between 
conscious and unconscious processes. For psychoanalysis, there is 
a separation between conscious and unconscious representations. 
Therefore an active process of repression lies at the heart of failures 
in working-through. On the other hand, cognitive approaches do 
not imply such an active process. They rather take into account the 
fact that pathogenic emotions are often automatic and implicit by 
nature and are difficult to regulate. Instead of “repression” as used 
in psychoanalysis, in cognitive-behavioral theory the preferred term 
relates to phenomena of activation or inhibition of representations 
from a multi-level perspective (several cognitive levels which cor-
respond to different neural structures); emotional representations 
can be activated simultaneously at various cognitive levels, some of 
which are conscious, while others are automatic and not directly 
accessible to consciousness.
Another difference between the two approaches has to do with 
the nature of the relationship between affect and representation. 
For the cognitive approach, affects and representations, whether 
conscious or unconscious, are linked together. For psychoanaly-
sis, on the other hand, affects can move from one representation 
to another. That idea, specific to psychoanalytical theory, entails 
some important clinical consequences. Displacement of an affect 
implies that the meaning attributed to it by the analysand (i.e., the 
representation with which he or she links the affect) often does 
not correspond to its real origin (the primary representation). The 
analyst listens to what the analysand is saying with the idea that 
there is some hidden meaning behind it; the analysand is “mistaken” 
as regards the meaning that he or she attributes to these affects. 
The work of analysis has as its principal aims making unconscious 
representations conscious and undoing the false associations/con-
nections attached to them; this will, in fine, result in modifying those 
emotions and affects. In principle, “processing” these representa-
tions (i.e., understanding them, acknowledging the existence of 
“false” connections and the corresponding affects/ emotions) will 
enable the patient to break free of them and develop new ones; in 
this way, the patient’s mental functioning will thereafter be more 
flexible and varied. It should also be pointed out that the psy-
choanalytical approach sets great store by verbalization. Putting 
words on these images facilitates conscious representation which, 
in turn, binds excitation. The analytical process thus leads analyst 
and analysand to construct a biographical “history,” the aim of 
which is to bind representations and enable changes to be made 
in the representational system itself.
In the cognitive-behavioral approach, the aim of the treat-
ment was initially to modify representations by introducing new 
information incompatible with any pathological representation 
(Lang, 1979). At present, the work now being carried out in this 
field (Linehan, 2000; Hayes, 2002; Barlow et al., 2004) focuses 
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exist and constraint the implications and applications of the body 
of knowledge generated by each approach. Nevertheless, we believe 
that a rich mutual cross-fertilizing could be achieved by learning 
to coexist and communicate with each other. More specifically, we 
think that it is both possible and desirable to compare the con-
clusions reached by each of these approaches, not only as regards 
their conception of mental functioning and of the dysfunctions 
that generate symptoms, but also with respect to the therapeu-
tic proposals that follow on from these. That kind of systematic 
comparison would enable their divergences and convergences to 
be explored.
conclusIon
There are significant differences between the psychoanalytical 
and the cognitive-behavioral approach. In particular, there is a 
wide gap between the conditions under which theories are con-
structed in these two approaches. Psychoanalytical metapsychol-
ogy is based on observations made by clinical practitioners. The 
cognitive-behavioral approach is based on empirical experimenta-
tion, which plays no part in psychoanalysis. As we conclude this 
paper, we must say that we think it is important to underline the 
fact that each approach must preserve its own specific features and 
acknowledge the fundamental methodological differences that do 
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